

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

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AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC

SECDEF

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S E C R E T JAKARTA 12776

EXDIS

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TAGS: PFOR, US, EX

SUBJ: SOUTHEAST ASIA IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: A VIEW FROM
JAKARTA

REF: BANGKOK 15626

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1. HERewith OUR COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR KINTNER'S THOUGHTS:

2. REMOVED SOMEWHAT, AS WE ARE FROM IMMEDIATE PRESSURES OF ASIAN MAINLAND, WE TEND TO SEE PURSUIT OF U.S. OBJECTIVES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AS MUCH AS IN STRATEGIC TERMS. RIGHTS OF UNRESTRICTED TRANSIT THROUGH THIS LARGE ARCHIPELEGO AND CONTINUED INDONESIAN SUPPORT IN INDOCHINA ARE IMPORTANT TO US, BUT SO ARE RIGHTS OF ACCESS TO INDONESIA'S RESOURCES AND OUR ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE USEFULLY WITH THEM ON MAJOR WORLD ECONOMIC ISSUES. WHILE SOVIETS AND CHINESE OBVIOUSLY HAVE VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS, SUCCESS OF OUR PURSUIT IN INDONESIA DEPENDS BASICALLY ON SOUNDNESS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE CANNOT, IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AT LEAST, FORESEE THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS HERE COMING FROM SOVIET OR CHINESE INFLUENCE. IT IS MORE LIKELY COME FROM ASSERTION OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM OR THIRD WORLD TENDENCIES AROUSED BY INTERNAL FORCES OR FROM DOMESTIC INSTABILITY.

3. WE WOULD THUS GIVE GREATER WEIGHT IN ASSESSING OUR FUTURE IN SEA TO RESILIENCE AND INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL NATION STATES IN AREA. ANALYSIS BASED ALMOST SOLELY ON GREAT POWER CONFLICT RISKS UNDERESTIMATING DEGREE TO WHICH NATIONS IN THIS AREA WILL DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE COURSE WHATEVER MAY BE DESIRES OF GREAT POWERS.

4. WE WOULD ALSO LEND GREATER WEIGHT, IN PLACING SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, TO IMPORTANCE OF STRONG AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL BILATERAL RELATIONS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, BETWEEN US AND NATIONS OF AREA. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE IS QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ACCESS TO ENERGY RESOURCES AND MINERALS FOR OURSELVES AND JAPAN DOES NOT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE OUTWEIGH OTHER STRATEGIC CONCERNS. SUCH ACCESS DEPENDS ON EFFECTIVE BILATERAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING AVAILABLE FINANCING, AN ESTABLISHED COMMERCIAL POSITION AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC NATIONALISM. IT WILL DEPEND, ALSO, MORE AND MORE ON DEGREE TO WHICH WE CAN RECONCILE OUR VIEWS ON TRADE AND FINANCE WITH LDCS WITH WHICH INDONESIA STILL IDENTIFIES ITSELF.

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5. NEITHER DO WE BELIEVE GLOBAL STRATEGY CAN BE DEVELOPED WITHOUT GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF FOOD AND POPULATION. AGAIN THESE ARE NOT PROBLEMS OF CONFLICT WITH SOVIET UNION OR CHINA BUT ARE ESSENTIALLY PROBLEMS OF CONFLICT WITH NATURAL FORCES IN WHICH WE HAVE CERTAIN DISTINCT ADVANTAGES.

6. SEEN FROM HERE SOVIET ROLE IN IMMEDIATE AREA IS MODEST AND NOT PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL. SOVIET INTEREST IN PASSAGE BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA CONSIDERED LOGICAL. THEIR PARALLEL INTEREST IN FREE PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS IS ACTUALLY OF HELP TO US IN LOS CONTEXT.

7. IN INDONESIA, CHINA IS THE PROBLE. WE WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANY U.S. POLICY WHICH TOO CONSPICUOUSLY APPEARED TO BE BUILDING UP CHINA'S POSITION. ALTHOUGH WE MAY CONSIDER IT ABSURD, THERE ARE ALREADY SUSPICIONS BEING VOICED IN IMPORTANT CIRCLES HERE THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGING A GREATER ROLE FOR CHINA AT THE EXPENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS.

8. WE WOULD AGREE THAT AN EFFECTIVE CONCLUSION OF OUR ROLE IN INDOCHINA PRESERVING A NON-COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN THAT AREA IS IMPORTANT HERE. INDONESIA LOOKS TO US TO HELP RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, HOPEFULLY BY COMBINATION OF DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE AND AID TO NON-COMMUNIST INDO-CHINESE STATES. A COLLAPSE OF OUR EFFORTS AND A FULL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF INDOCHINA COULD LEAD TO A GREATER INDONESIAN POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION WITH BOTH SIDES OF COMMUNIST WORLD AND TO GREATER COMPLICATIONS FOR OUR INTERESTS HERE. IF WE CAN OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, MAINTAIN INVOLVEMENT OF OUR CAPITAL AND EXPERTISE IN INDONESIAN ECONOMY AND CAN CONTINUE ACTIVELY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN THIS COUNTRY'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, INDO-CHINA LOSS WOULD NOT BE FATAL TO OUR PRESENCE.

9. UNDER PRESENT LEADERSHIP, INDONESIANS BASICALLY WELCOME OUR MILITARY PRESENCE AND INTEREST IN SEA. SUCH PRESENCE NOW PROVIDES BACKGROUND MAKING OUR VOICE IN INDONESIA SOMEWHAT MORE EFFECTIVE. IF INDOCHINA
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QUESTIONS ARE SETTLED IN SATISFACTORY MANNER, INDONESIA WOULD PROBABLY SEE LESS NEED FOR ANY OUTSIDE PRESENCE ON INDOCHINA MAINLAND OR, PERHAPS, IN INDIAN OCEAN AND WOULD LOOK FOR SECURITY TO STRENGTHENING OF ORGANIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES. WHETHER THIS IS REALISTIC OR NOT, IT COULD RESULT IN SOMEWHAT LESS INDONESIAN ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN AREA. AS LONG AS SOVIET FLEET STILL PRESENT AND BASIC ORIENTATION OF PRESENT LEADERSHIP NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY INTERNAL FORCES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT FORESEE ACTIVE INDONESIAN OPPOSITION TO SUCH PRESENCE.

10. LOOKING BEYOND INDOCHINA, THEREFORE, WE SEE OUR BASIC GLOBAL INTERESTS, AS THEY ARE MANIFESTED IN ASIA'S SECOND LARGEST COUNTRY, RESTING MAINLY ON OUR ABILITY

TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN STRONG COMMON ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND EFFECTIVE POLITICAL COMMUNICATION. ADMITTEDLY AN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE WITHIN INDONESIA OR A RETURN TO LATE SUKARNOISM COULD CHANGE THIS, BUT THESE DEPEND ESSENTIALLY ON INTERNAL FORCES. OUR FUTURE HERE DEPENDS FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AT LEAST, MORE ON HOW WE PLAY OUR CARDS WITH INDONESIANS THAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET FLEET OR CHINESE HEGEMONY ON MAINLAND.

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